Just a reminder, Andrew Gelman is now blogging at ScienceBlogs under "Applied Statistics".

Labels: Blogs

Real vs Placebo Coffee. There's a real effect. Though interestingly those who secretly were given decaf didn't notice it in their self-reports.

Labels: Coffee, Neuroscience

A review over at ScienceBlogs of a new paper, Intergenerational Wealth Transmission and the Dynamics of Inequality in Small-Scale Societies. I'm going to comment more in the near future, as I think this an give us insight into historical dynamics. An interesting find is that pastoralists and settled agriculturalists exhibit the same levels of heritability of material wealth (as well as the same values on material wealth). Hunter-gatherers and slash & burn agriculturalists seem to be at the other end of the spectrum.

Labels: History

The cover story for Sports Illustrated two weeks ago described the dominance of the South Eastern Conference (SEC) in US college football.

"More players are invited to the NFL combine each year from the SEC than from any other conference," Ole Miss's [Head Coach] Nutt says when asked about the quality of the athletes who compete in the league. "The most players drafted just about every year going back 10 years come from the SEC." Indeed, dating to the 2000 NFL draft, the conference has had 400 players selected; the next-best league is the ACC, with 364.

It's no mystery to Nutt why an SEC team has won the BCS national championship each of the last three years (Florida in 2006 and 2008, LSU in 2007) and is favored to produce the champ again this season. "I watch [teams in] other conferences all the time and I think, Boy, I'd like to play them," Nutt says.

But, for GNXP readers, this is the most fun comment.

It all starts with recruiting. Nutt says that players from the South, particularly those who reside in Florida, become better college players than kids from other parts of the country, though he can't explain why. "Maybe it's the sunshine," he says. "In any given year an average of 335 young men [from Florida] sign with Division I schools. When I was coaching at Murray State [in Kentucky], I remember going to Florida and seeing, maybe, coaches from Wake Forest down there. But now? You've got Wisconsin, Minnesota, Purdue, Virginia, Virginia Tech. You've got schools from North Carolina. They're all down there, and they're coming for the speed. We signed nine from Florida this year. Nine!"

Yeah! It's the "sunshine" that causes the "quality of the athletes" in the SEC. Caste Football calculates that the percentage of white starters at SEC teams is 25%, lower than any other major conference.

Of course, from a GNXP point of view, sunshine may be actually have played a role, but not in the way that Nutt implies . . .

Early (2002) reader of this weblog, William Gunn, is leaving a biotech company in San Diego and is looking for another job. Here's his Linkedin.

Labels: Blog

One hypothesis I have held is that there is a cultural gap in the United States whereby the West Coast and the Northeast are more "European" than the rest of the nation. So you have ideas crop up like Jesusland. I decided to see if I could compare European nations and American subregions using the WVS, Eurobarometer and GSS. I looked at two issues:

1) Belief in God
2) Nationalism

These two had equivalent questions in the 2000s for the WVS & GSS. I created an index of religiosity whereby:

Atheists & agnostic = 0
Higher Power = 1
Theist = 2

And:
Very Proud of Country = 3
Somewhat Proud of Country = 2
Not Very Proud = 1
Not Proud at All = 0




On these two traits I don't see much of a Blue America + Europe clade....

Note: Limited GSS results to the 2000s.

Labels: GSS, WVS

Andrew Gelman has started a new blog at ScienceBlogs, Applied Statistics. Someone should design him a header, perhaps a fancified Bayes' theorem?

Labels: Blogs

Steve points me to this Jason Richwine piece, Are Liberals Smarter Than Conservatives?. Richwine states:

Religion would seem to be the clear choice of smart people in this hypothetical example, but there would still be a positive correlation between IQ and atheism. The correlation exists not because smart people have necessarily rejected religion, but because religion is the "default" position for most of our society.

This same principle works in places where the default and iconoclastic beliefs are reversed. Japan, for example, has no tradition of monotheistic religion, but the few Japanese Christians tend to be much more educated than non-Christians in Japan. By the logic of someone who wants to read a lot into the Stankov study, Christianity must be the wave of the future, perhaps even the one true faith! But, of course, the vast majority of educated Japanese are not Christians. Just as with atheism in the West, the correctness of Christianity cannot be inferred from the traits of the minority who subscribe to it in Japan.

On the specific issue Richwine is right, Christianity is associated with higher socioeconomic status vis-a-vis non-Christianity across much of East Asia. You can go look in the WVS or Statistics Singapore. Though I do have to note that only in South Korea does there seem to be a positive correlation between theism and socioeconomic status (e.g., in Singapore those with no religion and Christians both have high SES and tend to be concentrated among young professional class Chinese, those with lower SES tend to be Muslims [Malays] and followers of Chinese folk religions). Additionally, in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore it seems that Buddhism has reworked itself to mimic the aspects of Christianity which made it more appealing to middle-class professionals. This is a classic case of a new equilibrium being attained after the initial outside cultural "shock" of Christianity. Finally, in Japan Christians are basically a rounding error (a few percent at most), so the example of Korea, where they are 1/3 of the population is of more relevance.

But I was struck by a general implication from Richwine's model. Two premises:

1) Elites, cognitive or otherwise, tend to deviate from the "default" norms of society for various reasons (it could be signalling costly behavior to show that they are "above" conventional considerations and such).

2) Eventually, the masses often emulate in the elites in subsequent generations.

The inference would be that cultural cycles should exhibit a pattern where the masses serve as lagging indicators of elite sensibilities. Once the masses start attempting to "catch up," of course the elites have moved on. Empirically implausible? I'll let readers dissect it.

Labels: History

Turns out some names do become popular because of celebrities. Though I guess in the "big picture" the names celebrities have is going to be random. (via Andrew Gelman)

Something that has been nagging me about the recent paper by Reich et al. which models Indian populations as a hybridization event between two ancestral groups, "Ancestral South Indians" (ASI) and "Ancestral North Indians" (ANI). As a reminder, the ANI seem to have been rather like Europeans in their allele frequencies, or at least far closer to Europeans than they were to the ASI (it seems that they compared ANI with Western Europeans). This is interesting. They found in the populations surveyed that the low bound for ANI was 40%, the high ~80% (in the supplements they included some Pathans and Sindhis from the HGDP, and that's where that number comes from). The ~40% low bound for ANI rather surprised me. The populations which they sampled included South Indian tribal groups. In other words, these were the groups arguably least affected by what we term Hinduism and Indian culture (their status as "tribals" as opposed to lower caste or outcaste was generally a function of the fact that they rejected integration and assimilation into mainstream Indian culture and isolated themselves both geographically and in terms of their customs). Just seems weird that these groups would be so ANI.

For a few weeks now Greg Cochran has been asking if I saw something in the paper above about when the admixture between ANI and ASI occurred, or at least if there was a hint about when the authors think it occurred. I said no, there are only hints. I was wrong, I skimmed over the supplement too quickly, they assume 200 generations ago as a parameter in a model they use for simulations. Bingo. Just click the image to the left, and look at the lower right. 200 generations = 5,000 years ago, assuming 25 years for generation time. Let's assume that a South Indian tribal group is a small deme of ASI surrounded by a very large (infinite) deme of ANI for 200 generations. If I assume a constant outmarriage rate of 0.25% per generation (1 out of 400) then at the present time you'd have the tribal group being ~40% ANI.

OK, what about my idea which I presented to John Hawks that Indians "don't really look" like a hybridization between Northern Europeans and the ASI, ASI assumed to be similar to the Andaman Islanders (who I do not believe were necessarily "Negritos," insofar as I suspect their small stature is due to contact with Europeans and Indians, as those who have avoided such contact are seen to be of normal or even above average size for South Asians). Specifically the frequency of light eyes and hair is just way too low among groups which are on the 70-80% ANI range such as Punjabis and Kashmiris, though these groups do tend have more Caucasoid features and lighter (olive) skin. On the other hand, here is something which jumped out at me about the Reich et al. paper: they added two Pakistani populations who fit well in the ANI-ASI cline which most of the Indian groups mapped onto (some groups with "Eastern" origin in both Pakistan and India were discarded from the analysis), and their ANI frequency proportions seemed familiar to me. There are three ANI estimates for both groups:

Sindhi - 78%, 70.7%, 73.7% (78%)
Pathan - 81%, 74.2%, 76.9% (81%)

In the parenthesis is the frequency for the derived (European-like) variant of SLC24A5. The data sets were the same, from the HGDP, though the ancestry estimates used only 10 and 15 of the approximately 50 of each group respectively. There's a suspicious correspondence here. The lowest frequency of the derived variant of SLC24A5 I've seen for a South Asian population is ~30% for Sri Lankan Tamils, with ~50% for Sri Lankan Sinhalese. Remember that a reasonable low bound for ANI for South Asian groups is on the order of 40%.

But what about my contention that other European-like pigmentation alleles don't fit because the phenotype isn't what you'd expect. You can look at a blue vs. brown eye variant of OCA2 in the HGDP. Another eye color variant, HERC2. And here is a variant of TYR which causes light skin. The interesting point would be to look at the Indian samples, but I don't have really good proxies for that (in one paper which surveyed Indian Americans various language groups ranged from 70-100% in derived SLC24A5 frequency, but it is very difficult to imagine that these correspond well to many groups in the Reich paper. Specifically, it's biased toward higher status/caste groups). I might have spoken too soon, though it still seems to me that something is off. Perhaps Europeans changed after ANI left. Or perhaps ANI changed when it arrived in India. One recent data point which I find curious is that a paper just came out which suggests that populations of the Andronovo culture in Trans-Siberia, which is assumed to be the precursor to the Indo-Iranians, seem to resemble modern day Russians in pigment phenotype. At least judging from the genes extracted and sequenced.

Labels: India, Population genetics

One of the persistent structural issues with American politics is that a greater number of Americans self-identity as conservative than liberal, so the Republican party can be dominated by conservatives in a manner in which the Democratic party can not. This is not to speak to whether people are in substance more conservative or not, rather, I'm still addressing self-perception. You can see the trend over the past 30 years from the GSS in the United States:



I was curious as to whether this bias is an international phenomenon. There is a question in the WVS which asks: 'In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?' The scale goes from 1, which is furthest Left, to 10, which is furthest Right. I looked at the WVS 3, 4 and 5 (a span from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s). Here is a histogram generated from the median values of all the nations (some replicated across waves):



As you can see, the central tendency just a bit to the Center-Right. The median value in the data set is 5.6 (standard deviation 0.68). No idea if this means anything, but I did wonder if sometimes there's a human cognitive bias to perceive oneself as "conservative" because of risk-aversion, but these results don't seem to be very strong (I'm sure some of the results, such as Vietnam, are due some strange quirks of phrasing which didn't translate well). Here's a table of the data points....

Country	Mean Political
Zimbabwe	3.7
India	4.4
Egypt	4.5
Spain	4.6
Andorra	4.6
Burkina Faso	4.7
Germany	4.7
Spain	4.7
France	4.8
Bulgaria	4.8
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	4.8
Germany	4.8
Spain	4.8
Serbia and Montenegro	4.8
Iraq	4.9
France	4.9
Russian Federation	4.9
Russian Federation	4.9
Slovenia	5
Republic of Moldova	5
Italy	5.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.1
Greece	5.1
Hungary	5.1
Israel	5.1
Netherlands	5.1
Slovakia	5.1
Great Britain	5.1
Albania	5.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.1
Hungary	5.1
Macedonia, Republic of	5.1
Netherlands	5.2
Switzerland	5.2
Uruguay	5.2
Chile	5.2
Germany	5.2
Macedonia, Republic of	5.2
Serbia and Montenegro	5.2
Croatia	5.2
Republic of Korea	5.2
Slovenia	5.2
South Africa	5.2
Great Britain	5.3
Slovenia	5.3
Cyprus	5.3
Albania	5.3
Belgium	5.3
Croatia	5.3
Portugal	5.3
Sweden	5.3
Australia	5.3
Belarus	5.3
Romania	5.3
Slovakia	5.3
Sweden	5.3
Switzerland	5.3
Ukraine	5.3
Brazil	5.4
Chile	5.4
Mali	5.4
Austria	5.4
Italy	5.4
Republic of Korea	5.4
Lithuania	5.4
Luxembourg	5.4
Poland	5.4
Armenia	5.4
Chile	5.4
Estonia	5.4
Latvia	5.4
Canada	5.5
Japan	5.5
Canada	5.5
Denmark	5.5
Nigeria	5.5
Uganda	5.5
Ukraine	5.5
Azerbaijan	5.5
Australia	5.6
Norway	5.6
Sweden	5.6
Finland	5.6
Ukraine	5.6
Rwanda	5.6
Ireland	5.6
Republic of Moldova	5.6
Northern Ireland	5.6
Finland	5.6
Nigeria	5.6
Norway	5.6
United States	5.7
Argentina	5.7
Peru	5.7
New Zealand	5.7
Morocco	5.7
Jordan	5.7
Belarus	5.7
India	5.7
Japan	5.7
Peru	5.7
South Africa	5.7
Argentina	5.7
Mexico	5.7
Poland	5.7
Uruguay	5.7
South Korea	5.8
Bulgaria	5.8
Finland	5.8
Iceland	5.8
Latvia	5.8
Malta	5.8
Romania	5.8
Turkey	5.8
United States	5.8
Bulgaria	5.8
Lithuania	5.8
New Zealand	5.8
Peru	5.8
United States	5.8
Poland	5.9
Serbia	5.9
Guatemala	5.9
Estonia	5.9
Jordan	5.9
Morocco	5.9
Pakistan	5.9
Brazil	5.9
Czech Republic	5.9
Georgia	5.9
Japan	5.9
Romania	6
Taiwan	6
Moldova	6
Georgia	6
Argentina	6
Czech Republic	6
Trinidad and Tobago	6.1
Philippines	6.1
Turkey	6.1
Mexico	6.2
Turkey	6.2
Thailand	6.2
Algeria	6.2
Kyrgyzstan	6.2
Venezuela	6.3
El Salvador	6.3
Hong Kong	6.4
Philippines	6.4
Ghana	6.5
Indonesia	6.6
Ethiopia	6.6
Indonesia	6.6
Puerto Rico	6.6
Taiwan Province of China	6.6
Colombia	6.6
Dominican Republic	6.6
India	6.6
South Africa	6.7
Zambia	6.7
Mexico	6.7
Puerto Rico	6.7
Venezuela	6.7
Colombia	6.8
Tanzania, United Republic Of	6.8
Bangladesh	7
Bangladesh	7.6
Viet Nam	9
Viet Nam	9.1

Note: The scale on the question is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. So 1-5 would be on the Left side, and 6-10 on the Right.

Labels: politics

Culture-gene coevolution of individualism-collectivism and the serotonin transporter gene:

Culture-gene coevolutionary theory posits that cultural values have evolved, are adaptive and influence the social and physical environments under which genetic selection operates. Here, we examined the association between cultural values of individualism-collectivism and allelic frequency of the serotonin transporter functional polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) as well as the role this culture-gene association may play in explaining global variability in prevalence of pathogens and affective disorders. We found evidence that collectivistic cultures were significantly more likely to comprise individuals carrying the short (S) allele of the 5-HTTLPR across 29 nations. Results further show that historical pathogen prevalence predicts cultural variability in individualism–collectivism owing to genetic selection of the S allele. Additionally, cultural values and frequency of S allele carriers negatively predict global prevalence of anxiety and mood disorder. Finally, mediation analyses further indicate that increased frequency of S allele carriers predicted decreased anxiety and mood disorder prevalence owing to increased collectivistic cultural values. Taken together, our findings suggest culture-gene coevolution between allelic frequency of 5-HTTLPR and cultural values of individualism-collectivism and support the notion that cultural values buffer genetically susceptible populations from increased prevalence of affective disorders. Implications of the current findings for understanding culture-gene coevolution of human brain and behaviour as well as how this coevolutionary process may contribute to global variation in pathogen prevalence and epidemiology of affective disorders, such as anxiety and depression, are discussed.

Here's what I see going on:

High pre-modern pathogen load → collectivist values → S allele & dampening of psychological responses associated with S allele in populations where it is extant at lower frequencies.

It's Open Access so you can look at their regressions yourself. The association with pre-modern levels of pathogens is a strong point for me, these sorts of biological factors would result in a consistent "push" over long periods of times which culture itself might not have. The agricultural civilizations of Asia were always going to be rich ecologies for infectious diseases. So it would be interesting to look at the frequencies of the S & L alleles on a finer scale; for example, in the islands of Japan. Though that case I suspect that lower-density areas would have had so much migration that selection wouldn't have time to maintain different allele frequencies.

Labels: Behavior Genetics

One thing that has bothered me, or at least piqued my interest, are two seemingly contradictory facts:

1) Many regions & nations have seen a resurgence of religion in the past generation (i.e., 1980s to 2010). The post-Communist and Islamic world most prominently. There is quantitative data for the post-Communist world, while for the Islamic world it is more impressionistic (e.g., the shift toward more stark outward "conservatism" in dress among the young).

2) But The World Values Survey does not show a skew toward religiosity among the young for most nations. Very few in fact. This is a bit curious in light of some plausible background assumptions. For example, religious people have more children the world over within each nation (though religiosity at the national level may have a more unpredictable relationship to fertility, as evident in Western Europe).

I decided to present the data which I'm basing the second assertion on. The WVS has several "waves." I decided to look at wave 5, wave 4 and wave 2, which were done during the mid to late 2000s, around 2000 and 1990 respectively. I also looked at the question:

How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.

The WVS interface outputs mean values (as well as standard deviations). You can then drill-down and cross with age of the respondents in 3 classes:, 15-29, 30-49, and 50+. I was curious as to age related changes, so I simply put the mean values of the importance of God by age class into the linest function. So, if the mean values were 7, 8 and 9 for the age classes from youngest to oldest, the linest would output a slope of 1 as I omitted x values (so the classes would be recoded implicitly as 1, 2, 3, etc. for x's). If you reversed it, it would output -1. So, negative values indicate that the younger are more religious than the old. Here are some trends in the data.....

Here are some charts ordered by the values generated by linest by wave. The countries at the top exhibit larger differences between the young and old. Observe the large asymmetry in the number with positive vs. negative values (that is, many more nations have more secular young than old). You need to click to see the larger version.





Some of the nations span the waves (many do not). 30 nations span wave 5 and wave 4. Here are the correlations between the same columns across waves:

Mean religiosity = 0.98
Trend of religiosity by age = 0.84

I don't know if the samples are representative (though the developed world ones do seem to be, I've checked with independent surveys and they often match up well), but the two waves seem consistent with each other here.

Now let's compare wave 2 and wave 5. So from from ~1990- to ~2005.

Mean religiosity = 0.92
Trend of religiosity by age = 0.77

How about differences in mean religiosity from wave 2 to wave 5? Here we see a bias toward greater religiosity in the 26 countries found in both waves.



The results match expectation. The nations to the right, those which have seen the most increase in religiosity are post-Communist ones. No surprise there. The nation furthest to the left is Spain, it's gone through the most striking shift toward secularism since 1990. That is in line with what the news reports, the position of the Catholic Church at the center of Spanish life has been collapsing since the 1980s (more accurately, since the end of the Franco regime).

One assumes that the difference in religiosity by age cohort is a feature of less religious societies. If everyone is religious, as is the case in some Muslim and African countries, then there can't be any variance. Merging all 3 waves together, here's a scatter plot which shows the trend:



Now a labelled plot of wave 5.



An interesting point of contrast is China and Spain. In the 1970s Spain was still a pro-clerical right-wing authoritarian regime, while China was an atheist left-wing regime. Political pressures toward conforming to a particular attitude toward religion have abated in both nations over the past generation, and while Spain has become much more secular, China seems to more religious. The mean value of the importance of God in one's life in China is 3.7 in the youngest age group, and 3.5 in the oldest (survey taken in 2007). In 1990 it was 1.5 and 1.8 respectively.

The big test would be to see how the 15-29 compared to 30-49 between wave 2 and wave 5. I'm a little worn out by this right now, so I'll look at that systematically tomorrow (or the next day), but spot checking Russia seems to show that the rank-order holds, but all age cohorts became more religious (not relevant for the youngest cohort in wave 5 because they weren't surveyed in 1990). In Spain the 15-29 year olds in wave 2 who became 30-49 year olds in wave 5 are invariant. If you want to get a jump ahead of me, here are some raw data file (excel):

religwave2.xls

religwave4.xls

religwave5.xls

Here are two preliminary comments:

* All the post-Communist nations have seen a resurgence in religion (perhaps with the exception of the Czech Republic). But this is a phenomenon which has "lifted all boats," older people who were militant atheists who went on anti-religious rampages in their youth have been swept along, just as generations who barely remember Communism exhibit the nominal culturally grounded religious sensibilities normal in many societies. I've read a fair number of news stories over the years about the generational "God-gap" in the post-Communist states, but I suspect that it makes a punchier story-line than to suggest that there's been a broader societal shift. That it isn't a case of atheistic pensioners vs. youthful churchgoers.

* The Muslim countries are really weird. On most of the religious data in the WVS the only nations which approach or surpass them consistently are the African ones, and these do not exhibit the uniformity of outlook of the Muslim ones, especially the "core" Muslim nations of the Middle East. In some of the surveys for Pakistan no Pakistanis in a sample of 2,000 will admit to not believing in God, and in one survey all the respondents gave the highest value for the importance of God in their life on a 1 to 10 scale. By all, I mean all 2,000. It isn't implausible to me that somehow someone who was really religious just recoded the survey data to make Pakistan seem more religious than it was, but if so that bespeaks a zealous conformity of outlook in the society. But overall many of the Muslim nations are so religious that there isn't variation in belief by age group because there isn't variation much of belief, period. Everyone's on the same page. When you see women donning the hijab or men growing beards I think perhaps we should reconceptualize what's going on, as it isn't renewed orthodoxy (belief) as opposed to a change in orthopraxy. Of course it may be that Muslim nations do exhibit variation in religiosity, but they're just off the scale here. I suspect of the funniest shock-documentary projects would be to have someone run into a public square in the Muslim world screaming that God is dead. Of course, it might be a suicide mission!

Labels: data, Religion