Hitler was a follower, not a leader. That’s the primary message of chapter 8. I find many of the arguments in this chapter about how demagogues and prophets persuade and lead on point, but I do wonder as to whether they’re truly insightful or counterintuitive in any way. Hugo Mercier cites evidence that Adolf Hitler was very careful about where and how to push the German public in the lead-up to the seizure of power by the Nazis (yes, he toned down some of the anti-Semitism). Mercier also points out that Christian attempts to impose morals and orthodoxy on people have usually failed. It turns out people have a mind of their own, and they often ignore what their social betters or leaders demand from them. In fact he argues that successful populists are nothing more those who are at the right time and place, personifying a mood in the populace and running with that.
The main question I would have here goes back to Hitler: this crazy evil guy sent Germany to the funeral pyre in World War II. Though I take his point, and agree with it, I think Mercier also underestimates how collective manias can grip people. Or, more precisely, he seems to dismiss that these were manias. Perhaps the Germans wanted to invade Russia! Perhaps they wanted to turn into a racial eugenics state!
Second, I think the more and more I read about it the impact of religions such as Christianity are on the margin. Most peasants remained rural pagans in their practices, but organized public paganism disappeared, and their practices and views slowly shifted. Mercier cites the 13th century, but from what I know there were major reform movements in the late medieval period, and of course during the Reformation and the counter-reaction from the Catholics.
The overall message that people have a mind of their own is mostly correct. But I think the exceptions really matter over the long term. So, no Hitler, no Holocaust.
“he seems to dismiss that these were manias. Perhaps the Germans wanted to invade Russia! ”
There wasn’t much enthusiasm in Germany at the start of the war in 1939 (something that was recognized to some extent by Hitler and other Nazi leaders, the last NSDAP party congress, scheduled for September 1939, was supposed to be the “party congress of peace”, to make the argument that Germany was striving to preserve peace in Europe). And while “Lebensraum” ideology did play a part in Nazi propaganda, it wasn’t really the argument Hitler used to justify the attack on the Soviet Union. Instead he said that he had done everything in his power to preserve peace with the Soviets, but that they had been planning an attack (and they had already shown their aggressive intentions anyway with their war against heroic little Finland and the annexation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia), so he had had no choice but to order a preemptive strike when this was still possible, anything else would have been iresponsible. It was a lie, but not the kind of lie he would have felt compelled to tell if there had been a general “mania” for war from below.
As for the wider point it’s of course true that Hitler’s ideas weren’t original, all the basic elements of his ideology existed on the German ultra-nationalist right (“Alldeutsche”) even before 1914, and presumably their adherents would have had at least some political influence even if Hitler had never existed or been killed in WW1. But without someone of Hitler’s personality (and his undoubted talents as a party leader and demagogue) events would probably have taken a different course.
all the basic elements of his ideology existed on the German ultra-nationalist right (“Alldeutsche”) even before 1914
And in universities throughout the West in some form or another. There was a mass forgetting in many institutions after WW2 about this fact.
People also forget that Germany was one of the most highly educated countries in the world when Hitler seized power.
It is was that earlier invasion of France in 1940 that had some of the Generals discussing a coup. But they were uncertain that they could get the lower ranks to cooperate, so they shelved the idea. Presumably they felt that they would have better opportunities down the road when the campaign turned into a repeat of WW1. With France (and Denmark/Norway) falling so quickly, Hitler was untouchable.
At the time that Hitler goes after the USSR, the USSR had been badly embarrassed in its Winter War with Finland. The German officers were, in general, in agreement with Hitler that the Soviets could be quickly defeated.
There was in all cases cynical window dressing for the general populace, but quick victory would go a long way toward quieting concerns.