I talked to Joe Henrich this week for The Insight about his book, The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous (the episode is going life next week). Obviously much of the discussion hinged around relatedness, kinship, and how that impacted the arc of history (we also talked about other issues, such as the status of the “big gods” debate, so most definitely tune in!).
So I was very curious when I saw a new preprint, Fine-scale population structure and demographic history of British Pakistanis:
Previous genetic and public health research in the Pakistani population has focused on the role of consanguinity in increasing recessive disease risk, but little is known about its recent population history or the effects of endogamy. Here, we investigate fine-scale population structure, history and consanguinity patterns using genetic and questionnaire data from >4,000 British Pakistani individuals, mostly with roots in Azad Kashmir and Punjab. We reveal strong recent population structure driven by the biraderi social stratification system. We find that all subgroups have had low effective population sizes (Ne) over the last 50 generations, with some showing a decrease in Ne 15-20 generations ago that has resulted in extensive identity-by-descent sharing and increased homozygosity. Using new theory, we show that the footprint of regions of homozygosity in the two largest subgroups is about twice that expected naively based on the self-reported consanguinity rates and the inferred historical Ne trajectory. These results demonstrate the impact of the cultural practices of endogamy and consanguinity on population structure and genomic diversity in British Pakistanis, and have important implications for medical genetic studies.
None of this is entirely surprising. The media in the UK has written about recessive disease load because of cousin-marriage amongst Pakistani Britons. But there are also things in the preprint that need to be made explicit. The “biraderi” social system is apparently a paternal lineage system in the northwest of the Indian subcontinent which transcends religion (i.e., it is present across the border in Indian Punjab). These are “tribal” or “clan” societies in a way that is not present across much of the Indian subcontinent. For example, my family is from eastern Bengal. Before the partition between India and Pakistan, the far northwest and northeast of the subcontinent had the highest proportions of Muslims. But that did not mean that the two regions were culturally very similar, explaining in part the war in 1971 that resulted in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, biraderi is not known, and the rates of cousin-marriage are much lower than in Pakistan.
One of the things I immediately noticed in the 1000 Genomes data is that Bangladeshis exhibit a lot less structure and stratification than Indians and the samples from Pakistani Punjab. In many ways, the patterns in the Bangladeshi genomes resemble the type of patterns in non-South Asian genomes: an outbreeding population without much internal structure.
This is not typical in South Asia. Rather, Indian populations tend to have lots of differences between jati/caste groups due to endogamy. To my surprise, Pakistani samples from Lahore were similar, though I attributed some of that to the migration of people from India after 1947 (a similar pattern does not hold for Bangladesh, as only a small number of people migrated from India). Additionally, the runs of homozygosity among Pakistani populations indicated lots of consanguineous marriages. While some South Indians marry cousins, the practice is very rare among North Indian Hindus. Rather, the genetic homogeneity of North Indian Hindus is due to the very high endogamy rates. They do not marry outside of their caste.
The results from the British Pakistanis are roughly in line with the 1000 Genome Pakistanis, but in this case, the researchers had much more granular ethnic data, as well as information on whether individuals were or were not the product of cousin-marriages. In terms of worldwide population affinity, there isn’t a great surprise. The Pathans, who are Iranian speaking, were distinct. The groups with putative Arab ancestry (Syeds), did not seem to have much of that (really, any).
The figure above shows the long-term effective population size patterns. Within the preprint the authors note that these northwest Indian populations began to diverge ~2,000 years ago. That is roughly in line with what Moorjani et al. found for their Indian samples. This tells us that these Pakistani populations were part of the same cultural milieu as Hindu populations in India itself, whose caste endogamy did not seem to crystallized until about that time. This also seems to run against the thesis presented by some Pakistani nationalists that the northwestern populations were very distinctive “non-Hindu” mlecchas. Al-Biruni and earlier observers identified caste as distinctively Indian, and the likelihood of population structure emerging at the same period in the northwest indicates that these people are broadly part of that milieu.
But I want to focus on the more recent period. Using various methods the authors estimate that the effective population sizes of many of these groups dropped 10-20 generations ago. If you assume 10 generations with generation times of 15 years, that’s 150 years. If you assume 20 generations with generation times of 25 years, that gives you 500 years. So let’s take that as our interval. What’s going on here? I think what this may illustrate is the spread of Muslim practices among Islamicized peoples of the northwest.
In my podcast with Henrich he mentions that Islamic societies are peculiar in their ubiquitous practice of “parallel-cousin-marriage.” This means that brothers will marry their children off to each other (a contrast with “cross-cousin-marriage”, common in South India, where brothers and sisters marry their children to each other). The ubiquity of cousin-marriage among Pakistani Muslims is a contrast with genetically and culturally similar populations across the border in India (Indian Punjabis do not marry cousins if Sikh or Hindu).
The fact that this practice occurred among an endogamous group for many generations has consequences. The figure to the right illustrates just how homogeneous some of these groups are against a generic European reference population. And, the fact that even unrelated individuals from the same biraderi group are often quite related. As you can see even people whose parents are unrelated still exhibit excess runs of homozygosity. This is simply a function of pedigrees being narrow, as just in Indian castes these individuals share many not-so-recent-ancestors.
A positive note is that this high level of inbreeding does not apply to Pakistani Britons where both parents were born in the country. That means that biraderi dynamics are maintained due to continuous migration from Pakistan. They’re not perpetuating themselves in the UK.
I started this post with Joe Henrich for a reason: if Henrich is correct that the differences in social structure and relatedness matter for development and economists, then Pakistan and Bangladesh might have different trajectories. Bangladesh is a corrupt and familialist society, just like Pakistan. But, that familialism is not as robust and articulated as is the norm in Pakistan. A transition to a more high-trust and non-familial society is more viable and an easier lift for a non-tribal culture where clans do not extend much beyond first cousins.
The most common generation length used to convert generation estimates to chronological years is 29 years, because you need to use the age of the parents at the birth of the median child of a parent, not the youngest one. This has proven to be quite robust in anthropological studies where it is possible to compare genealogy data to genetic data.
By that measure, 10-20 generations is 290 to 580 years, with a mid-point of about 435 that is a best fit to the data. Thus, 1440-1730 CE with a best fit of about 1585 CE and with the high and low ends of that time span disfavored.
This technical detail is pretty important in considering how the genetic data might correspond to historical events.
Events of just 150 years ago, which are very low in generation length (who has a median child at age 15 out of perhaps 6-8 children per women per lifetime in that era?) in addition to being at the extreme of a normal curve shaped probability distribution that disproportionately favors the central region. So, these genetic signals almost certainly come well before 1870 CE. We need to look deeper in the historical record for a plausible explanation. The other end of the range suggested in the post, at 1520 CE is much closer to the mark, but that’s because a still quite short generation length is counterbalanced by using the other extreme of the probability distribution in terms of number of generations. Basically, two moderate sized likely sources of inaccuracy offset each other.
When we evaluate the genetic evidence in light of a better estimate of generation size and some better assumptions of where in the probability range to look, the clear front runner in South Asian history to explain what we see is the Mughal Empire. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mughal_Empire
Seems like in the timing of Ne dip there’s some potentially complementary information with Ringbauer’s paper that found not much RoH in their analysis of transects in Pakistan adna even when those got into medieval period (and not much in Levant, but with a more scanty sample base). So that’s consistent with their guess of switch to group endogamy around 1500-2000 YBP, then this reduction in marriage pool and cousin marriage more recently.
More work on using these very homozygous samples to work out the likely impact of extreme homozygosity on phenotype, and timing dips, should help distinguish between what I’d call Strong and Weak versions of “Consang matters” hypothesis (perhaps calling them appropriately, perhaps not).
Strong Hypothesis: “Consang was relatively high through human history, then dipped decisively in Western Europe in the medieval period, paving the way specifically for a new type of social structure and psychology which allowed for development of science, capitalism”
(This is the full hypothesis of Henrich really as I understand it – the West broke with consang decisively in the medieval period, due to the Church and this had all kinds of consequences in WEIRDness, and this was the big change that happened).
Weak Hypothesis: “Consang at fairly moderate-to-low levels through human history, rose decisively and sharply in Islamic world in the late Medieval to Early Modern period, and this may have disadvantaged the Islamic world relative to the Christian West in adopting new technologies and modes of social organisation, whether through phenotype disadvantages directly from consang (inbreeding makes you dumber and less healthy) *or* changes in social organisation”.
(This is more the model that Western Christianity wasn’t unusual, but the Muslim world was, and this negated a more generally Eurasian, and within that possibly West Eurasian, advantage over much of the rest of the world).
In the Weak version, Consang doesn’t really help to explain the world divergences where time since first agriculture tends to predict GDP/capita today, or the emergence of modern society as such (with those being explained much more by simple technological accumulation over time)… but may explain the divergence *within* West Eurasia, where Western Europe “took off” (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-economic-history/article/western-reversal-since-the-neolithic-the-longrun-impact-of-early-agriculture/7D4A748D53A6474FF7D4F7ECC9DAA566)..
The paper says these Pakistani groups all diverged “within” the last 70 generations, but isn’t that like saying all Pakistanis converted to Islam “within” the last 1400 years? Which is to say some did, but most did not
Looking at the supplementals, most Punjabi groups fall in the 30-60 range, averaging out all the values gives around 45 generations. Which puts us somewhere in the 8th century. That is important, because the period from the 6th century to 11th is when the Punjab began to be seriously “Hinducized” (beginning with Mihirakula, and ending with the Shahis). Throughout the paper the “50 generation” figure is also used, though I could be missing the context.
Also, the “Pakistanis were Mlecchas” comes from sources as late as 200BC flatly stating that Punjabis and Sindhis are Mlecchas, that they do not observe caste, and are outside Aryavarta. That probably started to change after the Hunnic period like I mentioned above. In fact by the end of the Shahi period, its pretty clear that the Northern-Punjab corridor (the line from Sirhind to Peshawar) and extending right up to Kabul’s gates, is majority Hindu. Giovanni Verardi has some great papers about how Hinduism spread in this period/region based on seizing control of the urban areas and surrounding agricultural communities.
The key though is most Punjabis weren’t settled in the urban areas or (sparse) adjacent farmlands in this corridor. They were pastoralists roaming the plains of Punjab, only lightly touched by Hinduism (and likely Buddhism before that). These populations btw were also some of the last in the region to accept Islam. The first were actually the Hindu Kshatriya tribes (likely Bhattis) that were ruling the region before being ejected (and soon co-opted) by the Turks.
What are those sources, ArainGang? That date seems to imply that the caste system has its origins in the frontier society of the recently settled Gangetic plain, rather than being inherited from the IVC, or developing out of the imposition of Aryan elites over the post-IVC social structure. Very interesting.
Also, a couple of questions for the more knowledgeable:
Do we know when the Indus region became majority Muslim?
Do we have a model for how FBD marriage spread throughout the Islamic world?
Cousin marriage and consanguinity is a secondary, absolutely subordinate aspect of explaining the special occidental path (“europäischer Sonderweg” in German) to its societal structures and success.
It needs to be put into the broader context of the Catholic church totalitarian tendencies to destroy all social relations and control mechanisms beyond its reach. With the Germanic conquests, the church sold itself as a “state building institution” to its new masters, and it became, therefore, with the occidental dualism of worldly and spiritual powers, a major social engineer.
The main goal of most of what they did was to destroy and deconstruct all other higher level structures and relationships, other than those absolutely needed to be successful. The latter being the main difference to Roman early Christians and some later Christian sects also, as not to care for the basics and just work for the otherworld exclusively.
The Catholic church didn’t just forbid marriage between close cousins, but also between all kind blood relatives to the lowest possible degree and even all people related by marriage, by “godparenthood” and even additional aspects absolutely unrelated to blood relations. It also didn’t want “godparents” to be close relatives, so in just a couple of generations, the Catholic church forced people, at the height of that insanity, to marry outside of their village, even outside of their natural marriage circle (“Heiratskreis”).
They also supported the Feudal rule in determining who is allowed to marry at all, and they took away a huge portion of the decision making power of the patriarch of the family, the free men of the tribe – which they reduced to rubble.
The Catholic church introduced mutual consent as an absolute necessity for a marriage, a very late marriage age (for women) and allowed people to join monks and nuns respectively, even against the will of the family. They forced people with horror stories and nonsense to give their material wealth and heritage to the church, not their family, against which many families sued the church, because otherwise the church would have, at some point, owned practically everything.
They introduced celebacy for priests to prevent dynasties from popping up, the marriage laws made young people even of free farmers, quite often, servants and transformed them into a mobile, cheap labour force. The deconstruction of familial inheritance pattern was particularly destructive in England, where with the Norman conquest the Catholic church got unprecedented power over – even free – people.
So basically, the church and on the longer run the state got direct access to the individual, without significant intermediates, it reduced social relationships which were not seen as economic or useful to rubble, and disciplined the masses in a way no state has done before.
Because the church, as a Western state builder, became highly efficient and economically if ignoring the negative demographic and dysgenic trends they introduced.
Especially the Cistercians played an enormous role in spreading knowledge, education and advanced techniques. Like new village organisations, crop rotation, intensive land use, use of animal traction and natural powers (wind, water mills), heavy plough etc.
Occidental Europe was first colonised from within (“Binnenkolonisation”), then it expanded to the East, as far as it could (“Ostkolonisation”), then it tried to expand to the Near East, to the Holy Land (“Crusades”) and only when that didn’t work out, mainly because of the endemic diseases and internal struggles, lack of support from the mother land, lack of profitability of the enterprise, the direct route to Asia and the West became a prominent goal, leading to the discovery of America and the sea route towards Asia, circumventing the Ottommans et al.
Without the plague and Ottomans, which both hurt the European developlment very seriously, I guess a similar level than what was reached in the 16th-17th century would have been possible decades, even a century earlier.
The fundament was the social disciplination and technical innovations which became first widespread by the newly developed states and church. Just look at the urban laws of the high Medieval cities and how the efficiency of the peasantry and artisans even on the countryside were lifted at that time already. These were the fundaments, you don’t have such trajectories elsewhere.
The whole “cousin marriage” and “consanguinity” must be placed in this context of a direct grip of the state, church and law on the individual, without intermediaries, and the introduced efficiency and mobility of the labour force. Social relations became rationalise and reduced by a more economic and organisational perspective. This went deep for Christians, because not just their behaviour and laws, but their view on the world and “their sinful self” was changed. They began to internalise the values (especially work ethic) of the church (“ora et labora”). And contrary to the Eastern Christianity and especially Islam, it the outcome, the result began to matter more and more. Not useless pious actions, but working for a good result, not as much profit before the Reformation necessarily, but a good result for society, something “of material value” for the community. Like the Cistercians did par excellence.
Many states around the world, especially in the Islamic sphere, where satisfied by people following “the religious rules and customs” superficially, and by just skimming the surplus produced in the form of taxes, sometimes even ruining the local economy with too much pressure on existing structures. They rather suffocated than stimulated development.
Contrary to that, the Western church and state, introduced and spread innovations systematically, they improved in a planned manner the efficacy of their “dependent subjects”. And they did so again directly, almost without intermediaries, quite often, because like explained above, the social intermediate structures were largely annihilated by the Catholic church.
This was a high price to pay, because while this made occidental people the most effective state builders, on a low level, it made them highly vulnerable and demographically weak. So as soon as the state fails, they fail too, and by immigration, they can be easily outcompeted.
Like in the criminal world, clans are more effective than individuals. Its only a well-functioned, well-meaning state which makes that path successful and spreads it around the world. If a state doesn’t protect the norms created in centuries of occidental history, they get replaced by more effective lower level competitors.
On the other hand once the clans, castes and tribes being deconstructed, utterly destroyed, to allow cousin marriage and consanguinity doesn’t change anything. Many Protestant Germans and even late Catholics came back to normal, by marrying rather in the village, by marrying at least 2nd cousins etc. But that didn’t re-introduce the pattern from before, because the incentive for SYSTEMATIC cousin marriages, oftentimes predominant in clan systems, no longer existed. It became an INDIVIDUAL decision, of the marriage partners and their families. It was no rule or generally accepted custom any more and there was no reason why it should become such again.
“The main effect” of this Catholic totalitarianism was already done, the destruction of social intermediate structures between individuals and nuclear families.
And this process goes on to this day, because what else is “single mothers” and “childcare” outside of the family, in the hands, quite often, of the state, the church or an ideological (like Cultural Marxist) or big corporation-funded organisation? Its the final step to atomise all social relations and getting direct access to every single individual, without ANY social intermediates left any more.
However, that is a very unnatural and demotivating way of family life, because people invest in “children which are not theirs”, they are not just not their property, but getting sold to the educational rule of the state/church/ideologists/corporations directly. They are less than the old Roman “Proletarians” were, which at least owned their owned children!
So it doesn’t work out, in the current system, in a sustainable way and the root of this goes back to the Christian neglect for the wordly future, the natural family and any kind of social intermediates beyond their reach. Like the mastermind Paulus already made absolutely clear in the gospel – similar to Horkheimer in Cultural Marxist theory.
Its here, with Paulus, that Christianity became so deeply unnatural and destructive in its outlook on the world and future, absolutely contrary to Islam!
Just read this comment from Paulus:
“Now to the unmarried[a] and the widows I say: It is good for them to stay unmarried, as I do. 9 But if they cannot control themselves, they should marry, for it is better to marry than to burn with passion.”
So marriage is “a concession, not as a command”!!! If you can’t hold yourself, then marry, only once at best, only one women. Whether you get kids, doesn’t matter, because “this world doesn’t matter”.
Many people don’t know what Paulus said and really meant, but this deeply unnatural position on life and family was the base for the Catholic totalitarian control over family life in Western Christianity. Just read the comments by yourself:
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Corinthians%207-9&version=NIV
This is, by the way, the direct parallel to Cultural Marxism, which too just moralise and destroy, but have no sound plan for the future at all. Their imagined “moral superiority” stays tall above all “wordly concerns”.
That stupidity was left behind by Western Christianity, step by step, slowly, over the centuries. You can see that Christianity in itself was no road to success, by simply looking at how all the Christian denominations developed in comparison. No such big success stories at all.
It was the Western, the “social control fanatic”, mentally split, dualistic church (“Germanic aristocracy : Roman church”) which opened a path to economic rationality and on the long run, because of the dichotomy, the revival of ratonality, of reason and logic, of classical philosophy and sciences, which just improved an already highly effective, disciplined societal regime.
Because again, look at high Medieval towns and villages already, the organisational level, the efficiency, the mindset. It was all there already and similar ways were largely absent elsewhere in the world, even in regions in which the state and monetary system, for example, were more evolved in comparison originally, like China in particular.
airangang, your posts are really good, but they have throbbing visible motivated reasoning. good lawyer, so you do a good job convincing the believers. though few here, so perhaps don’t waste your time 😉
Follow up comment after having time to read stuff:
The Indian admixture dates from Moorjani are all over the place, ranging from 65-145 generations ago. UP Upper Caste dates are 65-85 generations ago. Per this study, most Punjabis diverged from each other 30-60 generations ago. So despite being conquered by the Aryans several centuries before UP, Punjabi genetic structure is emerging several centuries after their eastern neighbors. This goes against the idea of a uniform caste-crystallization reflecting Hinducization, affecting both Punjab and North India.
Also interesting to note the admixture date for Kashmiri Brahmins, who are directly related to Punjabi Brahmins, though are a bit younger. They show 103 generations. This implies the traditionally Hindu castes of the Northwest were already Hinducized around the early Vedic period, the wave just missed most in the region.
I’ll keep this comment reserved for genetics replies, but below I’ll leave one about textual sources for Punjabi Mlechaness.
Mahabharata (1100-500 BC), during the Late Vedic Period when the Aryans left the Punjab and moved into North India. Here is what they and their descendants have to say about Punjab and Sindh.
“There where forests of Pilus stand, and those five rivers flow, the Satadru, the Vipasa, the Iravati, the Chandrabhaga, and the Vitasa and which have the Sindhu for their sixth, there in those regions removed from the Himavat, are the countries called by the name of the Arattas. Those regions are without virtue and religion. No one should go thither. The gods, the Pitris, and the Brahmanas, never accept gifts from those that are fallen or those that are begotten by Sudras on the girls of other castes, or the Vahikas who never perform sacrifices and are exceedingly irreligious.
The regions are called by the name of Arattas. The people residing there are called the Vahikas. The lowest of Brahmanas also are residing there from very remote times. They are without the Veda and without knowledge, without sacrifice and without the power to assist at other’s sacrifices. They are all fallen and many amongst them have been begotten by Sudras upon other peoples’ girls. The gods never accept any gifts from them. The Prasthalas, the Madras, the Gandharas, the Arattas, those called Khasas, the Vasatis, the Sindhus and the Sauviras are almost as blamable in their practices.
There I heard that one at first becomes a Brahmana and then he becomes a Kshatriya. Indeed, a Vahika would, after that, become a Vaisya, add then a Sudra, and then a barber. Having become a barber, he would then again become a Brahmana. Returning to the status of a Brahmana, he would again become a slave. One person in a family becomes a Brahmana : all the others, falling off from virtue, act as they like. The Gandharas, the Madrakas, and the Vahikas of little understanding are even such.
Respectable peoples, the pious among all races are conversant with the eternal truths of religion. This cannot be said of the Madrakas and the crooked-hearted race that resides in the country of the five rivers.
The practices of these people are very censurable. They drink the liquor called Gauda, and eat fried barley with it. They also eat beef with garlics. They also eat cakes of flour mixed with meat, and boiled rice that is bought from others. Of righteous practices they have none.
How, indeed, would the Madrakas and the Sindhu-Sauviras know anything of duty, being born, as they are, in a sinful country, being mlechhas in their practices, and being totally regardless of all duties?”
There’s a few more good quotes from the Dharmasutras (600BC-200BC) but I think you get it.
The Indian admixture dates from Moorjani are all over the place, ranging from 65-145 generations ago. UP Upper Caste dates are 65-85 generations ago. Per this study, most Punjabis diverged from each other 30-60 generations ago. So despite being conquered by the Aryans several centuries before UP, Punjabi genetic structure is emerging several centuries after their eastern neighbors. This goes against the idea of a uniform caste-crystallization reflecting Hinducization, affecting both Punjab and North India.
i’m going to check this for motivated reasoning. if i find you being lawerly i will never read your comments again. i know priya moorjani and have conversed with her on this paper and i think you are misunderstanding it. you are either stupid, or you are want a particular answer. i suspect the latter…more later. i hope you are just too stupid to understand what’s going on here.
The Indian admixture dates from Moorjani are all over the place, ranging from 65-145 generations ago. UP Upper Caste dates are 65-85 generations ago. Per this study, most Punjabis diverged from each other 30-60 generations ago. So despite being conquered by the Aryans several centuries before UP, Punjabi genetic structure is emerging several centuries after their eastern neighbors. This goes against the idea of a uniform caste-crystallization reflecting Hinducization, affecting both Punjab and North India.
ok. so went back and spent time reading priya’s paper. it’s exactly what i thought: you are comparing the period of admixture and formation of the cline vs. the period when endogamy kicks in. these are two separate things. the emergence of caste formation is a separate issue than the emergence of the admixture cline. priya dates the emergence of caste endogamy to the guptas. do the math (i know this because she told me to my face).
are you simply stupid or a sophist? either way, if you make these simple errors i’ll just ban you. i dislike giving people the benefit of the doubt when they’re too dumb to know what they are talking about, or when they are lying (these are the two clear options). to be charitable you are driven by strong delusions and motivated reasoning and just garbled a bunch of stuff you barely understood to support your own hypothesis. if that, i’ll update my priors on how seriously to take your genetic interpretations when ppl ask me.
I’ll probably have to read Henrich to comment more, but I remember decades ago in college reading a critique that said a strongly family culture is supposed to have supported economic development in East Asia (father forces sons to invest together) and held it back in Latin America (father forces sons to invest together). The critique says the theory proves too much. Maybe Henrich is talking about a much earlier period though.
Razib’s post does remind me of a tangent though – my wild speculation as to why the first settlers of the Americas seemed to only thinly settle the entire hemisphere and didn’t kill off the megafauna. My speculation is that they came from an extremely small founding group and so were massively inbred, even after that founding population exploded to thinly settle both continents. Physical and possibly mental development problems stymied them from developing the population densities found later, and prevented them from developing or effectively using the hunting technologies that later doomed most megafauna. A somewhat later, presumably larger founding group that was the ancestors of most New World Indigenous groups then came in and replaced the earliest settlers.
Just a speculation, but I’m struggling to understand why the first settlers didn’t rapidly and densely populate both continents (dense by hunter gatherer standards), and maybe this is the reason.
My thoughts on this topic, long(is) form.
https://medium.com/@ArainGang/pakistanis-hindus-and-confused-genetics-9024300314c7
ArainGang: On your linked post: Razib apparently feels that the cessation of admixture in populations is not the same as the beginning of endogamy. This seems counter-intuitive.
Doesn’t seem counter-intuitive at all? Admixture can cease because… local variation in ancestry is simply exhausted. It obviously doesn’t have to stop only because of endogamy stops it.
i responded in the medium comments. if airangang wants to discuss genetics at this level…he needs to read gillespie. he’s making elementary errors cuz he doesn’t have formal background (unfortunately, intuition re: precision is only obtained through analysis of the data, which would prevent the confusions like being a few centuries different is a huge effect; it’s not)